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Abstract 
Synthetic biologists are extremely concerned with responsible 
research and innovation. This paper critically assesses their 
culture of responsibility. Their notion of responsibility has been 
so far focused on the identification of risks, and in their 
prudential attitude synthetic biologists consider that the major 
risks can be prevented with technological solutions. Therefore they 
are globally opposed to public interference or political regulations 
and tend to self-regulate by bringing a few social scientists or 
ethicists on board. This article emphasizes that ethics lies beyond 
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prudence and requires a cultural evaluation of the modes of 
existence of the various microorganisms designed by synthetic 
biologists, independently of their potential applications. 
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It is now well established that the emergence of novel technologies 
such as nanotechnology, genomics, or synthetic biology raises 
ethical issues. As these technologies reengineer life and promise 
revolutionary applications, they also generate concerns and risks 
that have to be addressed upstream. Ethics is viewed as the ordinary 
companion of science and technology in contemporary risk societies 
(Beck 1992). From the beginning, publicly funded research programs 
on synthetic biology have devoted a portion of their budgets to the 
study of potential ethical, legal, and societal impacts. The 
European EC-FP6 program funded SYNBIOSAFE, a project focused on the 
safety, security, and ethical aspects of synthetic biology (Schmidt 
et al. 2009). In the USA, the Synthetic Biology Engineering Research 
Center (SynBERC) brought together biologists, engineers, and 
humanities scholars to achieve its ambition of "making life easier 
to engineer." The community of synthetic biologists seems to be 
concerned with their responsibility as scientists. The international 
meetings launched in 2004 by the Biobricks Foundation include talks 
or even symposia on ethical and societal issues with the intention 
to “work together so that the ramifications of such efforts are most 
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likely to benefit all people and the planet” 
(http://sb6.biobricks.org/about/). Although “profit” is not 
mentioned, it is clear that synthetic biology is part of the general 
commitment to “responsible research and innovation” that has been 
epitomized by three "P"s in a report to the European Commission: 
“Responsible Research and Innovation as an outcome seeks to generate 
the ‘right’ end points which benefit people, planet and profit” 
(Sutcliffe 2011, p. 7).   
What is the outcome of ten years of buzz and concern about 
responsibility in synthetic biology? What are the measures to 
regulate the development of synthetic life, to prevent potential 
disasters, and to engage the public in technological choices? An 
overall survey of what has been done over the past decade is much 
needed but it would be beyond the scope of this article. Its 
ambition is more modest. It first considers the purposes and 
commitments to responsible behavior in various reports and 
initiatives in Europe and the USA. The second section tries to 
clarify what responsibility means for synthetic biologists, policy 
makers, industrial managers, and civic associations. The third 
section will emphasize the limitations of current ethical 
perspectives. Finally the article broadens the spectrum of ethical 
issues that remain to be addressed and discussed in a public arena.  
 
 
<A>Will to Responsibility<A> 
 
Synthetic biology is a heterogeneous field with a variety of 
research agendas and visions of the future (Deplazes 2009). The 
modular approach of the Biobricks program differs from metabolic 
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engineering, from the minimal genome approach, from in silico 
synthesis or computer modeling, and finally from the chemical 
synthesis of protocells. In turn they seem quite far from the 
ambitions of xenobiology aimed at the synthesis of alternative 
nucleic acids. It therefore comes as no surprise that synthetic 
biologists develop quite different views about their responsibility. 
Also, not all countries are equally engaged in synthetic biology 
research and the accompanying programs about ethical, legal, and 
societal impacts (ELSI). In Europe, a comparative study shows that 
such programs are well funded and developed in the United Kingdom, 
while there is no real effort on ELSI issues in Switzerland and 
Netherlands (Pei et al. 2010). Even in the UK, ethical and societal 
issues are not the prime concern. In stark contrast to the 2004 
report on nanotechnology by the Royal Society and the Royal Academy 
of Engineering (RAENG), which balanced challenges and opportunities, 
the report on synthetic biology published by the latter in 2009 is 
primarily focused on the potential competitive advantages generated 
by synthetic biology for the UK (RAENG 2009). 
In France, the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of 
Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST) published a report in 
2012 assessing the main ethical, economic, and social challenges of 
synthetic biology (Fioraso 2012). However, no concrete initiative 
came to match the national ambitions (Meyer 2013), apart from the 
creation of an observatory of synthetic biology, which is in charge 
of a bioforum, a series of stakeholders debates to be held in 2013-
2014.  
Science policy makers are obviously concerned although they are 
not presenting a wide range of proactive initiatives. The European 
Union launched a two-year project, Synbiosafe (2006-2008), which did 
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a very good job of identifying issues related to the method, 
applications, and distribution of synthetic biology. As it is 
assumed that synthetic biology does not raise novel ethical issues, 
the program resulted in a kind of checklist of standard issues such 
as biosafety, biosecurity, intellectual property, and social justice 
(Schmidt et al. 2009). This checklist of issues was later developed 
by the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to 
the European Commission (EGE) who “agreed that apart from safety 
issues associated with synthetic biology, an ethical, legal and 
political governance of synthetic biology is needed in the EU and 
worldwide to ensure that the interests of society are respected” 
(EGE 2011).  
Who is in a position to clarify the interests of society? Over 
the past decade scientific journals have published many articles and 
special issues related to synthetic biology with occasional 
commentaries about ethical issues. However, the buzz about synthetic 
biology has not really penetrated the public sphere. Despite 
spectacular announcements and a number of articles on biohackers, 
the media coverage for synthetic biology has been rather modest. In 
2010 a survey commissioned by the European Commission concluded that 
17% of the European public is aware of the existence of synthetic 
biology (European Union 2010).  
Does this mean that there is no concern at all in the civil 
society? The Canadian activist nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
ETC Group issued three alarming reports on synthetic biology calling 
for a moratorium (ETC Group 2007, 2008, 2010). Nevertheless, over 
the first decade, synthetic biology prompted very few public debates 
or citizen conferences. Apart from the citizen juries organized in 
the UK and a 6-month public forum organized by the French civil 
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society organization VivAgora in 2009, the subject is rarely brought 
into the public arena. There is no real dialogue with the society at 
large. Listening to the public might well slow down the pace of 
development that synthetic biologists want to maintain or 
accelerate. The conclusions of a public dialogue conducted in the UK 
together with 41 stakeholder interviews show that the promises of 
smart solutions to big issues such as renewable energy or medicines 
are not convincing enough to overcome all concerns. Significantly, 
the most serious concerns expressed in this dialogue are related to 
the motivations of scientists who, driven by their own research 
interests, might forget their responsibility (Bhattachary et al. 
2010). 
Nevertheless, the champions of synthetic biology in the USA did 
not forget their responsibility. They strive to behave as 
responsible engineers with regards to the products of their 
activity. In the series of international conferences Synthetic 
Biology x.0 organized by the Biobricks Foundation, ethical issues 
are an integral part of the programs. The first meeting in June 2004 
closed with a plenary lecture delivered by Paul Rabinow, a famous 
anthropologist at Berkeley (Rabinow 2004). The second meeting, held 
at Berkeley in 2006, dedicated a third day to four key societal 
issues: biosecurity and risks, public understanding and perception, 
ownership and sharing, and community organization. The third 
conference in Zurich had a few parallel sessions on ethics. At the 
Synthetic Biology 4.0 meeting in Hong Kong (2008), ETC Group hosted 
a panel session on global societal impacts. At the same time the 
gene companies grouped in an International Association of Synthetic 
Biology started negotiations to set up a universal code of conduct 
for screening orders (Maurer 2009). At Synthetic Biology 5.0 at 
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Stanford in July 2011, a poster session was arranged on “interacting 
with the world” (including risks, environmental, ethical, legal, 
societal, and philosophical issues). And SB 6.0, held at Imperial 
College in London in July 2013, called for papers on environmental 
and societal issues. This thematic organization emphasizes the 
concern with broader societal issues, and at the same time is 
reminiscent of the old divide between humanities and natural 
sciences.  
Thorough attempts at moving beyond the too famous divide 
between the two cultures are nevertheless noticeable. Social 
scientists have been invited to work closely with synthetic 
biologists, on a daily basis. In a number of research projects, 
humanity scholars have been “embedded.” For instance, the Paris Team 
in the 2009 iGEM competition was awarded a prize for the ethical and 
sociological analysis included in the project (Aguiton 2009). 
However, the junior scholar who was publicly celebrated during the 
jamboree in Boston had been in agony during the six previous months 
spent on the research team. She had been ignored, ostracized by the 
young science students who worked enthusiastically to prepare their 
biological part for the international competition. A more 
substantial commitment to ethics was the appointment of two senior 
anthropologists in the program of the consortium SYNBERC in 2006. A 
permanent section entitled "Human Practices" headed by Paul Rabinow 
and Gaymon Bennett was created and generously funded. The two social 
scientists were to follow the local daily research pathway of 
synthetic biologists. They deliberately discarded the conventional 
position of bioethicists speaking from an outsider’s perspective and 
made efforts to calibrate ethics to the actual research conducted in 
the consortium rather than to what was imagined or promised. They 
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consequently determined to observe the researchers, to participate 
in the weekly laboratory meetings rather than taking the futuristic 
visions developed in public discourses. However, this attempt at 
integrating ethics as a major component of research projects endedin 
2012 as the protagonists failed to engage in collaboration. This 
“anthropological experiment”--as Rabinow and Bennet name it--has 
been rejected by the leaders of the project (Rabinow and Bennet 
2012). In Year 5 of the project the Human Practices division was 
accused of doing only observation. Rabinow and Bennet were 
criticized and resigned. The division is now reconfigured as 
“Practices” and focused on issues of risks. Ethicists on board had 
to comply with the expectation of the synthetic biologists rather 
than developing their own research interests. 
This quick survey of various sites where ethical issues about 
synthetic biology are addressed suggests that ethics has been 
dominated by synthetic biologists who frame the relevant issues and 
hire social scientists to support and secure the advancement of 
their research projects. Despite the European urging for a multi-
stakeholder governance, despite the strong recommendations of the 
SYNbiosafe project, few citizens have been engaged in a dialogue and 
public interventions are not welcome. Synthetic biology revives the 
ideal of self-regulation discussed in the early time of genetic 
engineering, at the Asilomar Conference in 1975 (Cameron and Caplan 
2009).  
 
<A>How Has Responsibility Been Framed?<A> 
 
In their effort to pursue the Asilomar ideal of self-regulation, the 
community of the Biobricks Foundation has developed an ethos based 
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on openness and transparency. They invite amateurs’ practice and 
promote garage or DIY biology. They encourage young talents to 
participate in the construction of the Registry of Standardized 
Bioparts through the international annual competition iGEM. In thus 
challenging the established hierarchies of academics, they champion 
a democratization of scientific practice. They promote a new model 
of scientific sociability open to amateurs, based on enthusiasm and 
creativity.  
In addition, they are opposed to the regime of intellectual 
property in biotechnology and are working hard to initiate a regime 
of open biology, inspired by the movement of open access in computer 
engineering (Calvert 2012; Hilgartner 2012). The Biobricks 
Foundation has implemented a legal framework to ensure free and open 
access to the standard Biobricks collected at the MIT Repository of 
Standard Biological Parts. The aim is to develop open technical 
standards to characterize the Biobricks and to provide educational 
support to allow the public to use and improve the Biobricks. 
Sharing information and materials is viewed as a precondition for 
the success of synthetic biology because patents increase the costs 
of research to such a point that they become an obstacle to further 
developments. For Rob Carlson, the open source paradigm is necessary 
for a rapid increase of users of synthetic biology that will bring 
cost reduction and secure the commercial future of synthetic biology 
(Carlson 2010). Carlson’s plea for open source is not based on moral 
injunctions; rather, it goes hand in hand with epistemological and 
political recommendations. Carlson favors the strategy of chassis 
over synthetic genomics as the most promising approach because it 
reduces complexity (Carlson 2010, p. 102). Accelerating innovation 
in biotechnology requires molecules that behave in understandable 
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and predictable ways, for simulation and standardization purposes. 
Along with his epistemological choice of reductionism, Carlson 
presents the political options required for the successful 
development of synthetic biology. He vehemently advocates a free and 
deregulated market for synthetic biology, arguing that regulations 
are always leaky and inefficient. He refers to the ban on illicit 
drugs and concludes that “where there is a market, there will always 
be attempts to supply it” (Carlson 2010, p. 123).   
From the moral notion of responsibility, which implies 
obligations and the commitment to respond for one’s actions, what is 
retained? Since “ethical responses do not pre-exist the questions 
that elicit them” (Dupuy and Grinbaum 2004), what are the questions 
that prompt ethical concerns among synthetic biologists? The ethical 
debates in the series of SB conferences are essentially about risk 
issues. From the outset, biosecurity came up as the major concern: 
as synthetic biology can synthesize pathogen viruses it can be 
misused to make more effective bioweapons. The risk of bioterrorism 
is enhanced since artificial DNA can be purchased on the Internet. 
Stephen Maurer, a lawyer at Berkeley, outlined a code of conduct for 
protecting the public from the risks of bioterrorism, which relied 
on the capacity of gene companies to screen orders and on the 
scientific will and commitment for the field to regulate itself. 
This proposal raised controversy and 35 NGOs including ETC Group, 
GeneWatch, and Greenpeace, protested and urged to open a public 
debate on synthetic biology (Aldhous 2006).  
Biosafety is also a major concern. Significantly, in Europe the 
ethical agenda of synthetic biology has been set up in the program 
entitled SYNbiosafe. Although the outline of the project 
distinguished three categories of issues--method-related, 
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application-related, and distribution related (Desplazes et al 
2009)--there is a striking imbalance in the treatment of each 
category. Application-related issues have attracted most of the 
attention. The ethical awareness is most often limited to risk 
issues, thus reducing ethics to a form of prudence.1 Thus the culture 
of responsibility developed in the synbio community is more or less 
reduced to accountability. This term derived from book keeping 
denotes impersonal numbers, standardized rules, and procedures.  
In most countries, ethical discussions on synthetic biology 
revolve around risk issues and result in a list of standard issues 
to be addressed: biosecurity, biosafety, biohacking, intellectual 
property, and social justice. It is more or less the same checklist, 
which came from the programs dedicated to ELSI in nanotechnology. 
The mission of ELSI researchers is primarily to identify and clearly 
articulate a number of major issues raised by the development and 
diffusion of the emerging technology. And just as for nanoparticles, 
the discussions about the risks associated with synthetic biology 
center on the question: to what extent is it different from other 
biotechnologies? The risk issue inevitably shifts toward the 
question of novelty, which prompts two kinds of attitudes: the 
promoters of the emerging discipline are fond of revolutionary 
claims while people working for industrial companies rather 
emphasize continuity in order to reassure the public. On the one 
hand, Drew Endy and Rob Carlson claim the radical novelty of 
synthetic biology as they describe the current state of 
bioengineering as a modest bricolage. This unreliable tinkering with 
genes will be overcome by the more professional practices of the 
                                                
1
 In his lectures at Stanford University, the French philosopher Jean‐Pierre Dupuy occasionally compares the 
confusion between ethics and prudence to the mistake of a physics student who would not make the 
distinction between weight and mass.  
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Biobricks program based on the solid foundations of standardization, 
decoupling, abstraction2. On the other hand, when it comes to 
regulating industrial production, the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization (BIO) in Washington DC clearly states that there is 
nothing new or special about synthetic biology: “In our view, 
synthetic biology is an extension of the continuum of genetic 
science that has been used safely for more than 40 years by the 
biotechnology industry in development of commercial products” 
(Eickson et al. 2011).  
The kind of ethical research encouraged by synthetic biologists 
consists of prospective exercises meant to anticipate potential 
adverse effects. Ethics is focused on the identification of risks, 
and those risks are immediately balanced with the huge potential of 
benefits expected from the future applications of synthetic biology. 
Anticipating risks and making efforts to prevent them is considered 
as the ultimate responsible attitude. It means that the kind of 
ethics required by the proponents of synthetic biology has little in 
common with professional ethics. It is closer to the professional 
obligations of managers, including risk assessment, prospective 
studies and measures of prevention. Anticipating and preventing 
adverse effects is a managerial attitude. Synthetic biologists 
should go ahead and include upstream technical solutions to prevent 
potential risks. For preventing the dissemination of synthetic 
organisms and the risks of contamination of natural life, synthetic 
biologists demonstrate their prudence in suggesting novel forms of 
containment: in addition to the conventional measures of containment 
in laboratories, they plan to design synthetic microorganisms 
                                                
2
 However, it is worth mentioning that some synthetic biologists consider the Biobricks program more as a tool 
to bring students in contact with the field, through the iGEM competition, rather than as a serious program of 
engineering. 
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dependent on a specific artificial nutriment that cannot be found in 
nature. A third measure to prevent interplays with the environment 
is to engineer organisms with a genetic code that is not readable by 
ordinary DNA-based organisms. Thus, the attempts at synthesizing 
unnatural nucleic acids such as XNA are being justified as measures 
of prudence (Schmidt and Lorenzo 2012). 
Finally, issues of social justice have been so far addressed in 
terms of access to and distribution of synthetic biology resources. 
It is all about enabling innovative developments of synthetic 
biology through open access and preventing the enhancement of the 
global divide through an international dialogue. Never is there a 
hint that synthetic biology and other so called "technological 
fixes" could be one more alibi to avoid facing the world we have 
made through previous generations of technology. Rather than 
confront the underlying problems of over-consumption and waste, 
synthetic biology is promoted as a “remediation”--a means to 
“medicate” a solution for the earth.  
 
 
<A>Beyond Risks and Impacts, What Kind of Governance<A> 
 
Therefore, the kind of responsibility developed in an ELSI framework 
can hardly be considered as a true ethical attitude. It certainly 
fits in ethical theories that judge the rightness of actions based 
on the intentions of the moral agents. But good intentions do not 
guarantee responsible behavior. "Responsible scientists" motivated 
by the best intentions in the world might unwittingly turn into 
irresponsible citizens who shape unsustainable futures.  
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Although anticipating impacts is looking at the consequences of 
actions, ELSI research cannot be considered as an instantiation of 
consequentialism. This specific ethical theory judging the wrongness 
and the rightness of actions on the basis of their consequences 
(rather than on the intentions of the agent or the action itself) 
would require taking into account the contingency of the future. 
Instead of making decisions on the basis of calculable risks, a 
consequentialist has to take into account what we do not know, i.e., 
the ignorance generated by increasing knowledge, the scientific 
uncertainty embedded in synthetic biology. In consequentialism, the 
responsibility for the consequences has to be extended to the realm 
of “moral luck” when the course of the action to be judged depends 
on factors beyond the control of the moral agent (Williams 1981). 
The major limitation of the programs of anticipatory governance of 
risks in synthetic biology is that they simply overlook or even deny 
uncertainty. They rest on a blind adhesion to the reductionist 
manifesto of the Biobricks Foundation, assuming that human-designed, 
standardized, and well-characterized biological parts assembled into 
modules will be entirely predictable and that the synthetic organism 
will not have any emergent properties. Despite the doubts about the 
feasibility of this program, despite repeated attempts by experts to 
emphasize the radical uncertainty lying in synthetic biology 
(Rodemeyer 2009;)ethical and regulatory measures still rest on 
overconfidence in the control of synthetic microorganisms and deal 
almost exclusively with risks. In particular, the 2011 report of 
“BIOS,” the research program conducted by the Centre for Synthetic 
Biology Innovation at Imperial College on synthetic biology, refers 
to Sheila Jasanoff’s notion of “technology of hubris” to 
characterize the over-reliance on scientific evidence and 
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systematically downplays the uncertainties (Jasanoff 2003; Zhang et 
al. 2011, p. 16). The authors of the report propose to move from 
“scientifically informed bureaucracy” to “artistic governance.” In 
the face of scientific uncertainty, in the face of the variety of 
actors involved in synthetic biology and the variety of scientific, 
industrial, and geopolitic interests at stake, the most effective 
governance consists in a continuous provocation of reflexivity among 
stakeholders rather than in a rigid regulatory regime.  
Thus self-regulation, risk assessment and evidence-based policy 
have shown their limits. It is time to counterbalance the temptation 
to leave the governance of synthetic biology to a few dozen experts 
and let them decide if and how it should be regulated.  
 
 
<A>Of Microbes and Men<A>  
 
If we are to open up the field instead of closing it up on risk 
issues, and to develop an “art of governance,” on which basis can we 
appraise synthetic biology? First of all, it is important to try to 
disentangle the valuations underlying the design of biological 
artifacts, to clarify them in order to submit them to open debates. 
Anticipating the impacts that could be made by the products of 
genetic engineering is certainly a useful and proactive attitude. 
But the process of design in itself is value sensitive, especially 
when it comes to designing life.  
Whatever the purposes of their designers, anthropological 
meanings are embedded in biological artifacts together with deep 
cultural, albeit tacit, valuations. Using John Dewey’s conceptual 
distinction between valuations and evaluations (Dewey 1939; Bensaude 
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Vincent and Nurock 2010), this section aims to clarify the 
spontaneous and intuitive assessments (valuations) in order to 
foster reflexive judgments (evaluations). 
For this purpose, it seems better to proceed bottom-up, from 
the objects designed in synthetic biology up to their moral 
significance, rather than top-down from the perspectives of ethical 
doctrines. In liberal states, the governance of synthetic biology 
cannot be built on the basis of a privileged moral doctrine. Moral 
choices belong to the private sphere and cannot determine public or 
legal actions, whereas the government is expected to engage in the 
defense of core moral views such as humanity and nature.  
Even though Rabinow and Bennet failed to convince their 
scientific partners that they had to collaborate in order to 
construct an appropriate ethical framework, their central question 
remains to be addressed: to what extent do the objects designed by 
synthetic biologists question the definition of what it means to be 
human? Synthetic biologists create new objects, they refurbish the 
world with human-designed entities that are supposed to perform 
desired functions and self-reproduce without interfering with their 
environment. The mode of existence of the objects designed in 
synthetic biology laboratories at the borderline between the natural 
and the artificial, between the living and the non-living, 
inevitably questions the grand divides that are the backbones of 
modern Western culture. They raise issues about the place and role 
of humans in nature, their relations to animal life, and to the 
environment in general. 
The cultural evaluation of such value-sensitive objects of 
design cannot be conducted on synthetic biology in general. 
Distinctions have to be made between the various kinds of objects 
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designed under the umbrella of synthetic biology. Such distinctions 
should not be based primarily on the potential adverse effects that 
synthetic organisms could have–risk issues are only a minor 
component of the defense of core values--but will rather be based on 
their modes of existence.  
Are biosynthetic objects natural or artificial? In "essence" 
synthetic biology is about redesigning and reengineering life. Its 
products are hybrids of natural objects and artifacts. But all 
products of human technology are also hybrids, as Descartes already 
argued against the ontological divide maintained by scholastic 
philosophers between nature and artifice3. Like Descartes, and his 
contemporaries, synthetic biologists value the products of their 
design for two major reasons: artifacts are useful for cognitive 
purposes as well as for increasing human health and wealth. Their 
insistence on quoting Richard Feynman’s alleged saying--“What I 
cannot create I do not understand”--or Steven Benner’s emphasis on 
synthesis as being the best way to test hypotheses (Benner et al. 
2011) suggests that knowing through making is a major justification 
of synthetic biology. Social utility is even more valued, at least 
in the public discourses promising environmental and heath benefits. 
It thus seems that the ambition to design and control living 
organisms is in keeping with the humanistic ideal of modernity. 
Synthetic biologists still consider it their duty “de se rendre 
comme maître et possesseur de la nature,” to place humans above all 
other animal species. They feel free to use living beings (whether 
                                                
3
 Descartes: “I don’t recognize any difference between artefacts and natural bodies except that artefacts 
mostly work through mechanisms that are big enough to be easily perceivable by the senses (they have to be, if 
humans are to be able to manufacture them!)" (Principles of Philosophy, 1644, Section 4, § 203). 
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plants or animals) in their service.4 Synthetic biology is thus 
valued as the continuation of the long-term process of emancipation 
from nature, equaled with civilization. Far from being a 
philosophical watershed, it reaffirms that humans are in command of 
nature. This anthropocentric perspective justifies the serene 
response of the Vatican to Craig Venter’s announcement of the 
creation of a synthetic bacterium. As long as synthetic biology is 
not creating life de novo, and is working for the benefit of 
humanity, anthropocentric ethics is safe.  
However this anthropocentric perspective can be challenged from 
two alternative perspectives: Is it possible to countervalue 
synthetic organisms as “works,” as products of engineering? Is it 
possible to countervalue them as living beings? 
While nature remains a core value in our culture, artifacts 
also have their cultural dignity. They can be valued either as 
expressions of human creativity or as technical objects operating 
and enduring in the world. Do synthetic biologists praise 
technology? A striking feature of Craig Venter’s public presentation 
of his synthetic bacteria significantly named Mycoplasma 
laboratorium in 2010 is that he did not say a word about the 
engineering skills and the tour de force needed to implement a 
synthetic genome into the cell machinery of a neighboring 
Mycoplasma. Far from valuing the technicalities of this achievement 
he claimed: "This is the first self-replicating cell we've had on 
the planet whose parent is a computer" (USA Today 5/20/2010). 
Digital culture and design seem more highly valued among synthetic 
                                                
4
 This underlying valuation has been the target of an artist’s criticism through an extreme‐art project. The 
exhibit Synth‐Ethic in Vienna displayed “le cheval en moi” by Marion Laval‐Jeautet who has been injected with 
horse immunoglobin for several months and gradually developed tolerance to the point of accepting a 
transfusion of horse blood. She claims that animal is the future of humans. 
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biologists than technicality. Technicality as a mode of existence 
has been highly valued by the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon. 
In his view, a concrete technical object is not the implementation 
of a design project into the physical world. Nor is it the assembly 
of individual parts with each part performing a specific function. 
Such abstract and "hypertelic" constructions signal artificiality 
rather than technicality (Simondon 1989, p. 47). By contrast, 
technical objects come into existence through a process of 
individuation, including the "milieu" into their operating scheme, 
just as natural objects. The process of individuation is neither the 
juxtaposition of fixed individual functions, nor a subjection of 
nature to human interests. Are there any hints of valuation of 
technicality in synthetic biology? Clearly the objects designed in 
the Biobricks program are all but concrete technical objects (Kogge 
and Richter 2013). They are only individual parts, designed for 
performing a specific function waiting to be assembled in modules, 
that will still remain parts because no concrete entity can result 
from this process of Lego construction. As objects modeled on 
software engineering they are algorithmic machines rather than 
individual objects analogous to natural objects.  
The objects designed in the branch known as xenobiology are 
presented as unnatural or "orthogonal" even when they are designed 
as "analogs" of natural nucleic acids. Most of them are abstract 
objects--in Simondon’s sense--because they are designed for avoiding 
interactions with natural DNA in order to prevent risks (Marlière 
2009). Like soil-less cultures they are designed to operate off-
ground, independently from the cell’s natural environment. They are 
deprived of autonomy, and of the mobility and capacity to enter into 
new associations with their "milieu”. As products of human design, 
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they are neither the outcomes of contingent history like living 
beings, nor the outcomes of a process of individuation as concrete 
technical objects. They ignore the interdependency of individuals 
with their environment as well as the interdependency of present, 
past, and future, which characterize the mode of existence of 
natural and technical objects. As long as containment is the major 
concern of synthetic biologists, the problem of coexistence and 
synergies between synthetic organisms and natural organisms, which 
have acquired evolutionary capacities through billions of years, 
cannot be addressed. Therefore, such biosynthetic objects share no 
community of interests with living beings. There is no way for them 
to participate in a common world. They are from nowhere, from no 
time. They belong to the kingdom of utopia and uchronia but they do 
not acquire the cultural dignity of technical objects.  
What about yeasts and bacteria engineered or reengineered for 
synthesizing precursors of drugs or of biofuels? They only exist as 
instruments of production in a laboratory or a factory. They are 
production tools confined in spaces under control, as generations of 
microorganisms have been used in the manufacture of beer, wine, 
yoghurts over the past centuries. They have to be stabilized and 
standardized for entering into large-scale industrial production. 
From a biocentric perspective is it right to conceive living 
entities as machines performing functions for humans, to reduce them 
to chassis that can be functionalized in our service? Whatever their 
degree of artificiality synthetic organisms are living beings. As 
such they have an intrinsic value. For instance, the oncomouse 
designed in a Harvard laboratory for use as a research tool, which 
became a patentable invention and a commercial entity, has been 
depicted by Donna Haraway as a mouse that suffers so that we may 
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live (Haraway 1997). This transgenic and human-designed object 
nevertheless raises compassion and solidarity.  
Indeed, the organisms engineered by synthetic biologists are 
not like suffering animals. They are hardly considered as living 
beings deserving our respect. As heirs of two centuries of hygienist 
medicine even biocentric ethicists are more inclined to consider 
microbes as enemies rather than as moral subjects. Yet this 
spontaneous valuation may quickly change if we consider with the 
symbiotic relations between microbes and men. The thousand different 
species of commensal microorganisms associated with human bodies 
which form a complex ecosystem are highly valued by synthetic 
biologists who consider that thanks to their social interactions 
these microbes could be excellent vectors for deploying synthetic 
genetic circuits (Warren et al. 2011). If we accept that we are in a 
relation of mutual dependence with microbes we can no longer deal 
with them as simple means towards our ends. They rather can be seen 
as co-operators. Even though they may not suffer and raise empathy, 
they deserve care and assistance like domesticated animals, which 
have shared human lives through many centuries.  
More precisely, it is the reductionist concept of life 
underlying the project of designing synthetic organisms that is 
questionable from an ethical perspective. The Biobricks program, for 
instance, is typically framed along a Cartesian view. Living systems 
are made of functional parts that can be assembled into a machine 
like a watch. This mechanistic concept of life supports a project of 
exploitation. As George Canguilhem convincingly argued, the 
Cartesian theory of animals-machines conveniently supported the 
project of using them as machines in the service of men (Canguilhem 
1971). In stark contrast, Kant’s comparison between mechanical 
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machines (watch) and organic bodies (tree) emphasized the 
distinctive value of organized bodies. Unlike mechanical machines 
which have a "motive power," organisms have a "formative power." 
They self-reproduce, they maintain themselves. Their parts exist in 
relation to each other and to the whole, they are not designed by a 
clockmaker in accordance with a project. In this view living 
entities are an end in themselves and should not be used as machine-
tools for heteronomous ends.  
In conclusion, it is clear that the “responsibility” promoted 
by the synthetic biology community is far from satisfactory for 
addressing the ethical issues raised by this emerging technology. 
Without questioning the good intentions of synthetic biologists, the 
strategies developed to address ethical issues suggest a strong 
rejection of public interference or intervention in their turf. 
Moreover, the focus on risk issues encourage the belief that  
societal and environmental problems are amenable to technological 
solutions. The governance of uncertainties requires broadening the 
interface between scientists working in the field of synthetic 
biology and the civil society. If the objects designed by synthetic 
biologists are to be parts of our common world, they have to be 
evaluated from an ethical and a political perspective.  
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